ETSI TS 103 097 Secured-Message Reference
The wire-format specification that wraps every signed V2X message in the ETSI ITS stack. Defines the SecuredMessage structure, the header info fields, the signer-info modes, and the application-profile constraints. Layered on top of IEEE 1609.2 cryptographic primitives via an explicit equivalence mapping.
Scope & status
What 103 097 defines
The on-wire format for secured V2X messages in the ETSI ITS-G5 protocol stack: SecuredMessage envelope, payload framing, header-info population rules, signer-info choice, and per-application profile constraints (CAM, DENM, SPaT/MAP, IVI).
Relationship to 1609.2
Modern editions of 103 097 reference IEEE 1609.2 for the underlying certificate format and cryptographic primitives. The two standards are intentionally aligned: a 103 097 SecuredMessage carries a 1609.2 certificate or its HashedId8 digest. Implementations share the COER decoder.
Profiles
Profiles constrain what may appear in the header info, which signer-info mode is permitted for which message type, and how often a full certificate must be included rather than just its digest. The CAM profile (Cooperative Awareness Message) is the most studied; DENM (Decentralized Environmental Notification) has stricter freshness requirements.
SecuredMessage structure
protocolVersion
Uint8 — current spec version. Sentinel for receiver dispatch to the correct parser.
headerFields
SequenceOf HeaderField — ordered list of header info entries (generation time, expiry, signer info, generation location, etc.). Order is canonical for replay-resistance.
payloadFields
SequenceOf Payload — the protected application data. Typically a single signed payload carrying the unsecured ITS message (CAM, DENM, SPaT/MAP) as an opaque OCTET STRING.
trailerFields
SequenceOf TrailerField — carries the ECDSA signature field at the end of the message. Single-element in practice for signed messages.
HeaderField entries
generation_time
Time64 (microseconds since IEEE 1609 epoch, 2004-01-01) — when the sender generated this message. Receivers reject messages with generation_time too far in the past or future.
expiry_time
Optional Time64 — explicit expiry. Many profiles omit this and rely on generation_time + profile-defined freshness window.
generation_location
Optional ThreeDLocation — ITS-coordinate latitude/longitude/elevation. Required by some profiles where the verifier checks the message's geographic plausibility.
signer_info
SignerInfo CHOICE: self, certificate_digest_with_sha256 (just the HashedId8), certificate (full cert inline), certificate_chain (cert + intermediates). Cadence governed by the profile: every Nth message includes the full certificate, the rest reference its digest.
its_aid
Optional IntX — the ITS Application ID (PSID-equivalent). Identifies the application type for verifier policy.
its_aid_list
Optional list variant for messages carrying multiple application contexts.
SignerInfo modes & the digest cadence
Digest mode
certificate_digest_with_sha256 — carries only the HashedId8 of the signing PC. The receiver must already have the full certificate cached from a prior message; otherwise verification stalls until a refresh.
Full-certificate mode
certificate — carries the signing PC inline. Larger message, but lets a fresh receiver verify immediately without certificate-fetch round-trips.
Chain mode
certificate_chain — carries the PC plus intermediate AA certificate. Used when a receiver may not have the issuing AA's trust anchor cached. Rare in steady-state vehicular traffic; more common in infrastructure broadcasts.
Cadence pattern
Profiles typically specify: include the full certificate every N messages or every T milliseconds, whichever comes first. Between full-certificate beacons, messages carry only the HashedId8. The trade-off is bandwidth vs verifier cold-start latency.
Application-profile constraints
CAM (Cooperative Awareness)
Periodic broadcast at 1–10 Hz. Profile mandates generation_time, generation_location, ITS-AID for CA service. Certificate-inclusion cadence typically every 1 second or every 10 messages.
DENM (Decentralized Environmental Notification)
Event-triggered. Higher integrity bar: stricter validity windows, mandatory generation_location, often full certificate inline because the receiver may not have seen the sender previously.
SPaT / MAP
Infrastructure-originated signal-phase-and-timing and intersection-map broadcasts. RSU-signed, low frequency (~1 Hz), receivers cache the RSU's certificate aggressively because RSU identity is stable across thousands of vehicle interactions.
IVI (In-Vehicle Information)
Infrastructure-originated signage and warnings. Similar caching profile to SPaT/MAP; geographic-region restriction in the signing certificate is more commonly populated.
Equivalence with IEEE 1609.2
The two standards align at the cryptographic primitive layer; what differs is the wire format and the operational profiles. The table below shows the structural equivalents.
| Concept | ETSI TS 103 097 | IEEE 1609.2 |
|---|---|---|
| Signed message wrapper | SecuredMessage | Ieee1609Dot2Data with signedData |
| Certificate format | References 1609.2 Certificate | CertificateBase |
| Signer digest | certificate_digest_with_sha256 | HashedId8 |
| Generation time | Time64 (µs) | Time64 (µs) |
| Encoding | COER | COER |
| Signature | EcdsaP256Signature in trailer | Signature CHOICE |
Implementation implications
Bandwidth budgeting
A CAM with full-certificate signer info is ~250 bytes; with digest-only signer info, ~80 bytes. At 10 Hz per vehicle on PC5, the certificate-inclusion cadence directly drives channel load. Profiles balance this against verifier cold-start latency.
Receiver cert cache
A verifier maintains a cache of recently-seen signing certificates indexed by HashedId8. Cache size, TTL, and replacement policy are implementation decisions; the standard specifies the on-wire format, not the cache.
Replay window
Generation-time validation defines an implicit replay-resistance window. A few hundred milliseconds is typical for CAMs; DENMs use longer windows because the event-triggered messages may be rebroadcast.
SE signing cost
Each signed message requires one ECDSA signature inside the secure element. At 10 Hz CAM, that is 10 signatures per second per vehicle. The chosen SE silicon must sustain this throughput at automotive temperature ranges — a hard requirement on the silicon spec.
Companion AmbiSecure pages
Tools
IEEE 1609.2 V2X Certificate Parser · V2X Certificate Chain Validator — parse certificates referenced inside a SecuredMessage signer_info.
Architecture
V2X PKI technology page · V2X security solution · Connected mobility
Adjacent references
Hardware
IoT Security Co-Processor — secure-element silicon that satisfies the 10 Hz signing throughput requirement.
External references
Standards bodies
ETSI Technical Committee ITS · ETSI TS 103 097 (latest edition) · ETSI TS 103 097-2 (testing) · ETSI EN 302 663 (ITS-G5 access layer)
Related ETSI TS documents
ETSI EN 302 637-2 (CAM) · ETSI EN 302 637-3 (DENM) · ETSI TS 103 301 (SPaT/MAP/IVI/SREM/SSEM)
Disclaimer
This page is a structural reference summary of publicly available ETSI TS 103 097 concepts. For implementation conformance, consult the published ETSI standard directly.